RESISTANCE ON THE SEA BOUNDARIES: SMUGGLING IN THE EASTERN WATERS OF SUMATRA DURING UPHEAVAL TIMES 1946 – 1961

Mirza Ardi Wibawa  
Department of History, Faculty of Humanities  
Universitas Indonesia  
mirza.ardi01@ui.ac.id

ABSTRACT
Smuggling through the sea between Sumatra, Singapore, and the Malay Peninsula became a problem for the Indonesian government. This issue has a clash between informal and formal political forces so that claimed status of trade can be label as 'legal' or 'illega' depending on the capacity and presence of the applicable law. Moreover, smuggling could be considered as a resistance effort during the war and conflict periods. This problem can be seen in upheaval times, such as the independence revolution and regional uprising around the eastern waters of Sumatra. These waters became the gateway for the Republic of Indonesia to penetrate the Dutch blockade and smuggled weapons supplies along with international support. However, when there were rebellions by Darul Islam in Aceh and Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) in North Sumatra and Central Sumatra, smuggling was also used against the central government in Jakarta. This study uses the historical method, so after collecting historical facts related to smuggling through newspapers, books, and journals, and then interprets them from the perspective of legal anthropology to analyze smuggling during upheaval times as a resistance act to those who oppose politics and economics pressure.

KEYWORDS: Smuggler, Sumatra, Revolution of Independence, Regional Uprising.

INTRODUCTION

In two decades after proclaiming their independence, the Republic of Indonesia faced political and economic instabilities. The policies that had been made between 1945-1958 were unable to resolve the lag in various fields, as seen from the decline in economic growth during the war of independence which had not yet recovered in 1950-1967. The monetary situation was deteriorating; the annual inflation rate was skyrocketing due to unplanned ambitions from the manifestation of foreign policy that ignores the realities of the state's economy (Nordholt, 2011). The impact spread to every region, marked by the emergence of political upheaval which was also caused by socio-economic disparities. One of the resistance actions of those who opposed the central government was smuggling through sea boundaries.

The topic about smuggling through the sea boundaries, especially in regions connected to foreign trade, such as Malaysia and Singapore, can be traced back to the colonial period. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, there were several territorial changes between the British and Dutch colonies in Sumatra and Borneo. These boundaries not only define political power through
geographic boundaries, but also its economic networks. Trades from one region to another, along with its commodities, had to be registered under colonial law if it was not to be labelled as smuggling. Tagliacozzo (2005) mentions that smuggling can be defined any type of trades and commodities as far as the colonial government had their interest. In the Aceh War, for example, commodities such as agarwood, resin, and gold were listed as illegal goods because they advantaged the Acehnese during the war. It was different compared to salt trades which were strictly regulated by the colonial government because the price differed from one place to another (even tended to be cheaper when imported from the British colony), so the government had an interest to monopolize and label salt trading in Dutch Indies outside state regulations as 'illegal' (Tagliacozzo, 2005). Both cases indicate that the legitimacy to label smuggling can be caused by political and economic motives. But the cases of smuggling in this paper specifically caused by political interest such as war and uprising that took place in the post-colonial era.

The Republic of Indonesia which had gained their independence, came under political and economic pressure from the Dutch. On the land map, the Dutch Military Aggression captured the republic’s territory to become shattered and subdued, along with plantations and strategic cities that were seized back to the Dutch government. While at the sea boundaries, Dutch ships patrolled to prevent trade in and out to provide fund the war of the republican government. One of the alternative ways for the republic's resistance to survive and still connect with the outside world was smuggling through the sea. Singapore newspaper (Singapore Free Press, 1946) was reported that there was an export boom carried out by republicans of Indonesia through smuggling. The Strait of Malacca, which connects Sumatra and Singapore, was a hot spot for jung ships loaded with rubber, tin, copra, palm oil, quinine, and forest products. The goods were smuggled through Singapore, then re-shipped to Britain and the United States. Such actions were prohibited by the Dutch government, but for the Republic of Indonesia it became a strategy to fill the state treasury as well as diplomatic outpost with foreign support who could assist the struggle during the revolution of independence.

The question is how was this smuggling problem defined during the regional uprising? The news in The Straits Times (1954) entitled 'Smuggler now a Total War by Jakarta' shows that Indonesia turned to declared war on smugglers in the early 1950s. The reason was that the country suffered huge losses from this unlawful trade. Therefore, the Indonesian government tried to tighten its control over the eastern waters of Sumatra, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi. However, with the political instability in Jakarta that caused disparities outside Java, smuggling continued and was used by parties carrying out political unrest in the regions. Compared to the smuggling cases in upheaval times in the revolution of independence and regional uprising, this paper intends to analyze how the act of smuggling can be interpreted as a means of struggle against external force, beyond its meaning of breaking the law.

Several books and articles wrote about the issue of revolution or regional uprising did mention that these actions were used consciously by the ‘republican’ and 'rebels'. Like van Dijk (1981) in Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam: The Darul Islam in Indonesia. Regional uprising driven by Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) was an event that can be used as an example that smuggling is carried out based on political interests. In Aceh and Sulawesi, for example, despite efforts by security forces to tighten maritime security, smuggling activities remain unchecked in areas controlled by the rebels of Darul Islam.
Although the time setting is a period of national and regional uprising, this paper tries not to look only from a political point of view, but how to examine smuggling in the study of legal anthropology and consider economic and geographical factors. Therefore, it is necessary to understand how the historical point of view of this illegal activity can occur, such as Cribb (2011) "A system of exemptions: Historicizing state illegality in Indonesia" in Aspinall and van Klinken (ed.) The State and Illegality in Indonesia. Then Smuggling Cultures in the Indonesia-Singapore Borderlands by Ford and Lyons (2012); Tagliacozzo (2005). Secret Traders, Porous Border: Smuggling and States Along a Southeast Asian Frontier, 1865 – 1915; Ishikawa (2010) Between Frontiers Nation and Identity in a Southeast Asian Borderland. Interestingly, this illegal transaction is also carried out by barter, as Woonkyung (2016) wrote Illegalising Licitness? Bartering along the Indonesian Borders in the Mid-20th Century. Meanwhile, for reports on smuggling cases, this paper also uses newspapers published at the time of the events, such as the Singapore Standard, The Canberra Times, The Straits Times, and The Singapore Free Press. This paper aims to be able to explain an act of violating the law, which is interpreted differently by the disputing parties, both as a criminal act as well as resistance in uprising periods.

**BECOME SMUGGLER IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION**

The foundation of the international law of the sea is a product of the struggle and strength of mankind to seek domination over resources (Vidas, 2011). Therefore, the sea becomes a decisive element to geopolitical power. After the end of World War II, there were many changes in the international law of the sea. Mochtar Kusumaatmadja (1983) saw that there were some crucial factors related to these changes among others due to a large number of newly independent countries, that resulted in transitions in the political map of the world; technological advances, and the increasing dependence of countries on biological and mineral wealth in the sea. Indonesia as a newly independent country adopts the law of the sea which was used during the Dutch East Indies period through the **Territoriale Zee en Maritime Kringen Ordonantie 1939**. On the other hand, the Dutch efforts to restore their colony also applied the same law. The two claims of the law of the sea were overlapping with each other, considering that the territory of the republic continued to change during the period of the independence revolution.
The waters in the eastern coast of Sumatra became the battlefield for the republican government’s resistance to the Dutch forces who wanted to blockade trade routes and diplomacy struggle. Commodities from mines and plantations were brought from the interior of Sumatra to the foreign country through the sea. However, the Dutch control of important port cities was a big challenge. Several territories of the Republic of Indonesia (RI) were successfully captured due to the military aggression carried out by the Dutch during the years of 1947 to 1949. The fall of Palembang and Medan, which were originally RI trade gateways to Malaya and Singapore, was replaced by Aceh and Jambi (Cribb, 2000). Smuggling through the sea remains an alternative to the struggle during the revolution.

As stated in The Singapore Free Press (1946), the Indonesian Minister of Welfare, A.K. Gani said "I am the biggest smuggler in Southeast Asia". This statement was made in response to the increasing cases of smuggling via the Malacca Strait during the war of independence. A.K Gani believes that there was no alternative but smuggling, and according to him, this action was a defensive strategy for Indonesia to gain their independence. In Palembang, A.K. Gani controlled the province of South Sumatra which was a region rich in export commodities since the colonial period, such as oil and rubber. These goods were smuggled into Singapore and bartered for textiles and daily needs. These actions considered illegal according to the Dutch who blockaded Indonesian territory. Cargo ships contained goods without a license from the Dutch administration were stopped, inspected, and confiscated. The Dutch government claimed that these goods came
from plantations and mining owned by private companies that were seized or looted by republicans during the revolution (Cootamundra Herald, 1947).

When the Dutch returned to Indonesia at the end of 1945, the two countries were in a state of conflict. The Dutch had to reclaim their former colony from the Republic of Indonesia which had already declared its independence. Armed conflict was unavoidable in every region. On September 26, 1946, Indonesia’s Minister of Défense, Amir Syaruddin, broadcasted that Indonesia was ready for a ceasefire if the Dutch and the Allies created three conditions: Stop the dispatch of Dutch troops to Indonesian territory immediately; the ceasefire shall apply to the entire territory of the Indonesian archipelago; the Dutch blockade on land, sea, and air of Indonesia must be stopped (The West Australian, 1946). However, these three conditions were not conducted, even after the two sides made diplomatic efforts from 1946 to 1949. The deadlock condition in diplomacy caused conflicts and smuggling cases continued.

The act of smuggling by republican fighters was carried out as an effort to break through the Dutch blockade. On the other side, the Dutch claimed that the goods traded by republicans are illegal because they looted them from property that belonged to private companies before the World War II. Historically, raison d'être of these claimed based on a network of legal and illegal trade in the Malacca Strait that has been existed since the 19th century. Therefore, the meaning of 'legal' and 'illegal' in these territorial boundaries that were also in dispute during the revolution, could be very complicated. According to Abraham and Schendel (2005), there is an ‘area’ between social habits and state’s legal that is considered as an unlawful act yet could be commonly acknowledged by communities at certain times, such as conflict and war. In other words, smuggling in a borderland that was politically unreachable by the state as a formal authority, the status of smuggling can be overlap between illegal, which is not legitimizied by law, but licit based on acknowledgment by people around dispute and conflict area. (Woonkyung, 2016).

**Table 1**
Authority Competition (Source: Abraham and Schendel, 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Legal</th>
<th>Illegal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Licit</strong></td>
<td>(A) Ideal</td>
<td>(B) Crimes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Illicit</strong></td>
<td>(C) Crony Capitalism</td>
<td>(D) Anarchy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The position of the Republic of Indonesia to trade with Malaya and Singapore as a strategy of resistance was seen as illegal by the Dutch who claimed Indonesian territory, while the economic blockade by the Dutch had prevented diplomatic efforts from connecting with the outside world. The struggle to penetrate this blockade have been carried out systematically with the involvement of the Indonesian Navy and local governments to prepare export goods. Since early 1947, the Indonesian government also established an official representative in Singapore called the Indonesian Office (Indoff) to secretly managed Indonesia's foreign diplomacy and organized barter trade. A representative office led by Mr. Oetojo Ramelan and his staff become a state intermediary with Singaporean traders to provide merchant ships (Poesponegoro, 2010). The Ministry of Defense also formed a representative called the Ministry of Defense for Foreign Business (KPULN). The task of this agency was to buy weapons and war equipment, then import
them into Indonesian territory by a cut through the Dutch's economic blockade (Poesponegoro, 2010).

Oetojo Ramelan's efforts were also supported by high-ranking Navy officers such as John Lie, who became the international spotlight since 1947 for his shrewdness in smuggled war supplies and medicine from Singapore to Sumatra. However, in 1949 the ship named 'outlaw' he sent from Phuket was caught by a Dutch patrol in the Malacca Strait. The ship, which was sailed by eighteen Indonesian crews with a cargo of several vehicles and medicines, was intercepted after 90 minutes of pursuit by a Dutch Navy corvette (Malaya Tribune, 1949).

Smuggling activities were concentrated in the eastern waters of Sumatra. This area geo-historically had been an arena for smugglers to play their big business since the colonial period. From smugglers' long trading experience across the straits, they had taken advantage of the speed and the possibility of hiding to outwit colonial Navy patrols (both British and the Dutch). Most smugglers cross this border with knowledge of local conditions. While the colonial states were not able to learn how smugglers' modus operandi, from time to time the smugglers learned how to outsmart the state (Tagliacozzo, 2005). In other words, some parties have been in this business for a long time and have made the illegal trade of export goods between Sumatra, Malaya, and Singapore become licit activities.

In the previous explanation, it was mentioned that Indoff had a relationship with ship owners in Singapore, which was dominated by the Chinese. Amir Sjarifuddin admitted that Chinese jung smuggled Sumatran rubber and rice in exchange for Malayan textiles (The Straits Times, 1946). Likewise, A.K. Gani promised huge profits for Chinese shipowners in Singapore by carrying full loads from republican ports, if they provide the exchanged them for goods of daily needs (The Singapore Free Press, 1946). The interest in Indonesian export goods during the revolution was not only attracted by the Chinese traders in Singapore, but also by American businessmen. United States trading companies such as Isbrantsen Inc. also maintained a relationship with the Banking and Trading Corporation (BTC), a semi-government trading office led by Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo and Dr. Ong Eng Die. In its first contract, Isbrantsen planned to buy export goods from Indonesia, such as sugar, rubber, and tea. However, their ship which docked in Cirebon carrying goods ordered by Indonesia and was about to transport its order was intercepted by the Dutch Navy and then transported to Tanjung Priok, while its cargo was confiscated (Poesponegoro, 2010).

The Dutch intervention turned products that were considered legal into illegal by dragging merchants involved in Indonesian trade into criminal law inside territorial sea boundaries where they have claimed. For example, there was a case of the captain of Singapore-flagged motorboat T.D. Richard who detained by the Dutch court in Surabaya. He was charged with smuggled illegal goods into Indonesian territory with a load of weapons which he planned to exchange for coconut oil and rubber. Captain Richard admitted that he did not know that these items were prohibited and needed permission to enter Dutch-controlled Indonesian territory (The Singapore Free Press, 1948). Although the items brought were weapons for the needs of the Indonesian war, the Dutch and British also claimed that several commodities were listed as prohibited goods.

The Indonesian government's perspective towards smuggling had changed after gaining full sovereignty in 1950. Since then, the Indonesian government started to combat smuggling because these actions had increased as the state's economy declined. While the major players on
smuggling during the revolution were the Indonesian government against the Dutch government, the stage in the 1950s was the Indonesian central government in Jakarta contra several uprisings by military officers and local figures who demanded the decentralized government and economic equality for their regions.

**ECONOMIC PROBLEM AND SMUGGLING IN REGIONAL UPRISING**

After gaining full sovereignty, the republican government inherited an unstable economic situation and damaged infrastructure, which reduced the production of export commodities. These problems were the impact of warfare and guerrilla sabotage. The targets were not only transportation and communication facilities but also irrigation and electricity supply. But the result of this physical damage was relatively small compared to the challenges of establishing a new country and restructuring the monetary and fiscal system. The guerrilla wars of the 1940s caused hyperinflation because financed by printing money. The state apparatus had not run efficiently, while the nationalization agenda had also become urgent because the foundations of important business sectors were still dominated by companies and experts from the Dutch. Therefore, two economic problems, such as balancing the government budget and controlling the printing of money were integral to solved political problems (van Zanden, 2012).

The cabinet led by Mohammad Natsir from the Masyumi party should have been dedicated to changing this situation. Natsir's cabinet came to power when the 'Korean Boom' was underway. The Korean War created a huge demand for rubber exports and increased the state's source of income (Mackie, 2007). However, this fortune situation was the result of exogenous shocks (external forces) rather than the impact of strategic fiscal policy. The peak of the Korean Boom then passed in the mid-1951, and Indonesian exports began to decline in the following years. The budget deficit in 1952 reached almost 3 billion rupiahs, compared to a surplus of 1.7 billion rupiahs in the previous year (Mackie, 2007). The cabinet after Natsir clearly could no longer benefit from the Korean Boom and therefore faced much more difficult challenges.

In the second half of the 1950s, several movements also challenged the central government due to the unequal development in regions outside Java. The local government, in response to the lacked allocating national budgetary, forming military councils. These events weakened the Cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo II, hence on March 14, 1957, Prime Minister Ali returned the mandate to President Soekarno. The government then imposed the status of Staat van Oorlog en Beleg (SOB) or 'the state in emergency and war' (Poesponegoro, 2010). In the Djuanda’s Cabinet as the successor of Ali’s Cabinet, a National Council was formed. The function of this council was as an advisor to the government, and to accommodate the aspires of the forces that exist in society. However, the National Council that had formed did not change the uptight situation of the country. Events that escalated the tensions were the attempted assassination of President Soekarno in Cikini on November 30, 1957. Since then, political turmoil had remained a problem, such as the PRRI/Permesta uprising in the late 1950s, until the era of Liberals Democracy changed to Guided Democracy.

One of the main problems of democracy with Indonesia's economic development was the balance between Java and Outer Java. The problem was related to the dominance of the Javanese representation in the national political landscape. Through the 1955 general election Java's
dominance in policymaking became more pronounced. The national income and budgetary system managed in the early 1950s distributed most of the regional income from the Outer Java provinces into Java, especially Jakarta, whereas these main exports such as oil, rubber, copra, tobacco, and tin are all produced in Sumatra, Kalimantan, and other ‘outer’ islands (van Zaanden, 2012). This unbalanced policy triggered jealousy over provinces outside Java and caused the smuggling still to exist, even it was driven by the regional uprising that protested the central government in Jakarta.

The idiom of smuggling through the sea accompanied by regional uprise in the 1950s exposed the weakness of the central government to integrated local political power. It can be seen by economic losses along with the rebellion by local military officers and radical groups. In the previous explanation, it has been explained that there were formal and informal powers who managed illegal trade across national borders during times of conflict. As happened during the colonial and revolutionary times in the 1950s, the motives of smugglers remained based on agreements between parties that regulated trades and legal products imposed by the state. The critical point is every legal system faces problems with capacity. However, during the upheaval period from 1945 to the 1960s, the law capacity of the Indonesian government fell far too short of the standards required by the law itself (Cribb, 2011).

The parallel regulatory system in a country that had no longer disturbed by external conflicts, created a lucrative situation for smugglers held by informal powers to counter the state's law, while at the same time being the apparatus. (Ford and Lyons, 2012). If we consider the competition component variable in table 1, the trend of smuggling entered matrix C, namely government cronies. In the study of smuggling, collusion by the state authorities had always been a significant subject. However, there was political power that declares their position as enemies of the state to become smugglers and rebels at the time of regional uprising. So, it could be emphasized that the government's crony capitalism in matrix C during the regional uprising in the 1950s at the eastern waters of Sumatra, meant military officers or local leaders who tried to challenge the power of the central government in Jakarta.

However, the Indonesian government, which initially used smuggling as a strategy to fight against the Dutch blockade, became the most disadvantaged when informal political forces became the parties that helped the regional uprising. Therefore, since gaining full sovereignty, Indonesia turned to fight against smugglers operated around the waters between Sumatra, Malaya, and Singapore, both for economic and political reasons. In July 1950, Indonesia had lost at least 5 to 10 million dollars per month in goods smuggled into Singapore via the Malacca Strait and Riau Islands. The ambassador of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia (RIS) for Singapore said that the RIS government had put all its attention into efforts to quell smuggling in the region. The RIS government asked the Singaporean authorities for assistance in inspecting imported goods from Indonesia (Singapore Standard, 1950a). However, the activity of smugglers had not diminished. In addition to tightening patrols in the waters east of Sumatra, particularly in the southern part, the government makes centralized regulations at each port in regulating the legality of the trade. But the smugglers used counterfeit documents to register their cargo. For example, the box carried lead and rubber listed as soap (Singapore Standard, 1950a). This action shows that smuggling groups are getting more organized and outsmarted the state's law.

Smugglers transformed in new ways, but were they still driven by the old players? RIS Ambassador to India, Soedarsono, in an interview in Rangon, said that the Chinese population in
Indonesia were active traders as intermediaries with Singaporean traders. However, most of these traders are involved in smuggling. His statement drew strong reactions from the Chinese chamber of commerce in Singapore. They denied the accusations, calling them 'unjust' and 'uncalled'. The spokesman for the chamber of commerce said that smuggling was recognized as common during military aggression because the blockade from the Dutch paralyzed traditional trade between Malaya and Indonesia, so this action was a response to find a way out of the difficult situation faced by both Chinese traders and the Indonesian government. Instead, he saw smuggling during the 1950's decade because of the weak control of the central government, thus disturbed honest traders (Singapore Standard, 1950b).

On the other side, trade regulations in the 1950s were not yet firmly established. After accepting sovereignty, the Indonesian government still opened barter trade between the ports in Sumatra and Singapore, so barter trade in this region become common until 1958 Indonesian government decided to completely ban barter trade. This happened after the enactment of the staat van oorlog en beleg (SOB) status due to the outbreak of upheaval in several regions. Barter trade at that time was common due to the lack of monetary conditions in the border regions. Even at that time the term legal smokkel legal or legal smuggling was still carried out in a formal manner, or 'legal in disguise' (Woonkyung, 2016). However, the response of regional figures to the ban on bartering and the central government's intention to regulate regional trade was one of the factors that triggered the rebellion.

In general, regional disappointment arose because the trade organized by the traditional network was disrupted amid weakening trust in the central government. The presence of the central government set trading fees reduced the income of the provinces that produced export commodities. In Aceh and South Sulawesi, the government was unable to control foreign trade. Smuggling is getting out of hand in areas controlled by Darul Islam (DI) rebels. According to van Dijk (1981), the DI rebellion in Aceh was also more financially fortunate than other regions because of the distance of Aceh's geographical location to the Malay Peninsula, making it easier to smuggle money, goods, as well as to manage relations with foreign networks. DI Aceh figures such as Daud Beureueh and Said Abubakar also briefly crossed the Malacca Strait to Penang or Singapore to obtain financial support and established connections with communist rebels in Malaya.
These illegal firearms trade for the DI rebellion in Sumatra could relate to the smuggler's networks in Malaya. Local newspaper from Medan on February 18, 1954, reported that two packages of firearms smuggling managed to land in Simpang Ulu Village, North Sumatra, to strengthen the DI troops led by Said Abubakar. Operations by the Indonesian security forces succeeded in securing the village but failed to confiscate its weapons (Kalgoorlie Miner, 1954). The arms smuggling also occurred the following year, as reported that two Chinese ships smuggled British-made firearms brought from Penang to Aceh (The Straits Times, 1955). Some opinions said that this weapon was brought from China via Burma, then to Indochina, and reached the north of the Malay Peninsula. In 1957, President Soekarno also received reports of an illegal arms trade carried out by the leader of Permesta, Colonel Vantje Sumual with the foreign broker in Japan. Illegal weapons smuggled against the central government were exchanged for copra and distributed at various points of uprising in Indonesia (The Straits Times, 1958a). It was similar with the declaration of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI) in North Sumatra and Central Sumatra which also increased tensions between the Republic of Indonesia and the Federation of Malaya because the Federation was more sympathetic to the PRRI rebels and offered weapons.
supplies from Western countries (Cribb, 2000).

However, smuggling carried on by the interests of military figures in Sumatra was also initially motivated by the context of regionalism and the displeasure of the status quo controlled by the central government (Smail, 1968). In Medan, one of the events that broke the situation was the scandal at Teluk Nibung between a Chinese trader from Medan, Chin Hock, and Colonel Mal auditing Simbolon during January – July 1956. Chin Hock smuggled rubber into Malaya, while Colonel Simbolon protected and received his share. As an excuse, he argued that the profits from the smuggling were used to build military barracks and to improve the welfare of the troops under his command. In the perspective of Jakarta as the central, Colonel Simbolon's actions were clearly against the law and showed the weakness of the central government. On the other hand, in Medan's view as 'regional', smuggling was a consequence of the inability of the central government to distribute 'wealth' and 'power' (Smail, 1968).

The Indonesian government's response to the smuggling was a blockade with warships along the Malacca Strait, rivers that flow into the waters of East Sumatra, and around ports controlled by rebels. Merchant ships that passed through these waters had to go through several checkpoints for inspection before reaching Singapore (Doeppers, 1972). The Indonesian government had also asked merchant ships with a weight of 50-80 tons in Tanjung Pinang to become troop’s landing ships. Chinese traders worried that if this order continues, it will paralyze the trade because millions of dollars in rubber and copra trade were stuck in Central Sumatra (The Straits Times, 1958). This situation was analogous to the turbulence in a revolution of independence. Both the Dutch and Indonesia conducted the blockades to keep their sea boundaries from smuggling. Meanwhile, on the one hand, smuggling is carried out as an effort to resist political and economic pressure.

The central government's intention to be present in a turbulent period had been seen as a nuisance. Repressive measures in the late 1950s succeeded in suppressed smugglers and rebels. Indonesian Navy cooperates with the Malayan federation government to suppress smuggling in the Malacca Strait. In March 1959, many speed boats belonging to the 7th Darul Islam regiment were intercepted off the coast of Riau. In Sulawesi, several attacks launched from warships succeeded in crushing the remnants of the Permesta rebels at Minahasa. The Inobonto village, which was known as a smuggling center for Permesta soldiers, was also bombarded by warship artillery from the sea. So, were the presence of the state in these repressive operations effective in suppressing smugglers during the regional upheaval? Permesta was crushed in 1961; The Darul Islam rebellion ended in 1962 (The Canberra Times, 1959). But for the informal forces that support smuggling, it only means as a frontpage to a new chapter (Ishikawa, 2010).

CONCLUSION

The case of smuggling in upheaval times proves that the power of the state to established 'legal' and 'illegal' claims was not adequate by the legal capacity to control order. In Indonesia, informal political power had taken on significant roles, both in war and peace. So, the formal political power defined by geographical boundaries does not exceed the efficiency of informal power defined by socio-cultural boundaries. It also had been proven that during upheaval times, such as the independence revolution and regional uprising, the informal power that regulates
foreign trade can be executed without the support of the state. On the one hand, the state's apparatus tasked with enforcing the law becomes one with the socio-cultural influences of informal parties. In the eastern waters of Sumatra, trading during turbulent times awakened traditional networks, so the relations used by smugglers exceeded the political power and legal capacity of the state.

The case of smuggling is only one of many legal problems that occurred in sea boundaries, so the topic of crimes at sea such as piracy, smuggling, and illegal fishing becomes more relevant in the future to use a historical perspective. The territorial area of Indonesia, which is dominated by water areas, also shows that the potential for losses due to illegal trade through the sea will be even greater. It was mentioned that since World War II ended, many countries have developed maritime doctrines, including Indonesia. Apart from the motivation to take control over biological and mineral resources, the sea in this era of globalization is very a determining element for geopolitical power because it is the vein of trade as well as diplomacy and defence. Therefore, if the capacity and power of the law of the sea are not effective while informal political power and cronies are increasingly dominant, then smuggling practices which biased in the context of 'legal' and 'illegal' as well as 'licit' and 'illicit' as in the upheaval times, will be increasing in the future.

REFERENCE


Cribb, Robbert (2000), Historical atlas of Indonesia. University of Hawai'i Press


Malay Tribune (1949, October 5) ‘Guns and Bibles’ Speedboat Captured.


Singapore Standard (1950a, July 10) Indonesia Asks S’pore to Help End Smuggling $10 million Loss a Month.
The Canberra Times (1959, March 26) *Indonesian Navy Ships Bombard Rebels*.
The Singapore Free Press (1946, December 19) *Big Scale Smuggling to Singapore*.
The Singapore Free Press (1948, Mei 27) *Skipper on Smuggling Charges*.
The Straits Times (1946, April 21) *Smuggling Between Sumatra & Malaya*.
The Straits Times (1954, October 6) *Smuggler now a Total War by Jakarta*.
The Straits Times (1955, Mei 28) *Arms ring: Officials in the dark*.
The Straits Times (1958a, March 17) *Arms Deal in Japan: Large Sums of Money Smuggled Out of Country*.
The Straits Times (1958b, March 3) *Colony Fears Ships Seizure*.
The West Australian (1946, September 27) *NEI Truce Talks, Nationalist Terms*.