ABSTRACT

Terrorism in Indonesia originated from the rebellion of Islamic groups, which fought for the establishment of an Islamic state. They consider the war against the government as *jihad*. As was done by *Darul Islam* (DI) or the Islamic State of Indonesia/*Negara Islam Indonesia* (NII) in 1950, with a base of resistance in West Java. The government foiled this movement through military operations. In the next era, acts of terror often occurred in Indonesia, such as the Christmas Eve bombing, attempted assassination of President Soekarno's family, the Bali bombings 1 and 2, JW bomb. Marriott and the most horrendous was the Surabaya Bombing incident, which was carried out by two families against several churches and the Surabaya Police Headquarters. The most recent was the attack on the Coordinating Minister of Politics and Security, Wiranto, and the bomb in Medan Regional Police. Some acts of terror also occurred in areas of interreligious conflict in Indonesia, such as in Poso and Ambon. Several acts of terror that occurred in various regions in Indonesia and foreign countries such as Mindanao and Afghanistan, among them, involving some Bima citizens as perpetrators, not to mention the terrorist acts against the Police that occurred in the Bima Region. Responding to several acts of terror that occurred, the Government, through the Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT), established 12 (twelve) Regions as the Red Zone of terrorism in Indonesia, one of which was the Bima Region. It makes the phenomenon interesting to be investigated because, on the one hand, various efforts to counter terrorism are intensified, but on the other hand, acts of terror continue to occur. In this article, the author would focus on countering terrorism carried out by BNPT, the National Police, and how the community's participation.

KEYWORDS: act(s) of terror, red zone, and counter-terrorism

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism in Indonesia originated from the rebellion of Islamic groups, which fought for the establishment of an Islamic state. They consider the war against the government as *jihad*. As was done by *Darul Islam* (DI) or the Islamic State of Indonesia/*Negara Islam Indonesia* (NII) in 1950, with resistance bases in West Java. The government foiled this movement through military operations (Solahudin, 2011).

In 1957, there was a bomb explosion at the Sekolah Perguruan Cikini of Central Jakarta, with the intent to kill President Soekarno and his family. The background was the dissatisfaction
of some people with President Soekarno's policies. President Sukarno was seen as hampering the implementation of Islamic law in Indonesia and supporting Communism more. Among the perpetrators were Dompu and Bima, namely Tasrif Bin Husain, Saadom Bin Muhammad, and Yusuf Ismail. In that incident, President Soekarno and his family survived the threat of bombing. On October 16, 1963, Presidential Decree No. 11 of 1963, concerning the law on the eradication of subversive activities was issued (Tempo.co, 2015).

Bomb terror continued in the era of President Soeharto's leadership. Among them, there were bomb blasts at Nurul Iman Mosque in Padang, West Sumatra in 1976, bomb terror at the Istiqal Mosque in Jakarta in 1978, bomb blasts at BCA Bank Pacenongan in Central Jakarta in 1984, bomb blasts at the Express Bus in Banyuwangi, and bomb blasts at Borobudur Temple Central Java on January 21, 1985 (antaranews.com, 2016).

After the 1998 reform, acts of terrorism resumed. In 1999, there were bomb blasts at Pasar Senen and Atrium Plaza in Central Jakarta, bomb blasts at Ramayana Shopping Center, and bomb blasts at Atrium Plaza in Central Jakarta. In 2000, there were Christmas Eve bombings in several churches in Indonesia, a bomb explosion at the Philippine Ambassador to Indonesia, and a bomb explosion at the Jakarta Stock Exchange Building. In 2002, a bomb blast occurred at the Cijantung Mall in South Jakarta, a bomb blast at Padi's Cafe and Sari Club, and near the American Consulate Office in Legian Kuta Bali. Then, in 2003, there was a bomb explosion at the JW Marriot Hotel in Central Jakarta.

In 2010, the government issued Presidential Regulation No. 46 of 2010 concerning the establishment of the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT). In 2012, the regulation was amended with the Republic of Indonesia Presidential Regulation Number 12 of 2012, as a State apparatus tasked with coordinating counter-terrorism. The formation of the BNPT is a state policy as the development of the Terrorism Eradication Coordination Desk (DKPT) formed in 2002, under the coordination of the Minister of Politics and Security.

After the BNPT was formed, several terrorist activities took place, namely in 2015 the Alam Sutra and Tanah Abang bombs and a grenade explosion in Duren Sawit, East Jakarta. In 2016, a series of shootings took place on MH. Thamrin Street and the Bomb Plaza Sarinah Jakarta explosion, six times. To enforce criminal acts of terrorism, up to 2016, the National Police has handled 14 cases of criminal acts of terrorism in all regions of Indonesia. During the investigation process, 78 people were named as suspects, and ten of them were killed during the arrest process (Karolina, 2019).

On Wednesday, May 24, 2017 evening, an attack suspected of having been a suicide bomb in the Kampung Melayu Jakarta Terminal re-occurred. In that incident, three Polri members died, and two suspected perpetrators were killed. Then, on 13 and 14 May 2018, there was a bomb terror in Surabaya, East Java, targeting three churches and one police station. On the morning of May 13, 2018, there was the first explosion at the Church of the Gereja Santa Maria Tak Bercela Ngagel in Surabaya. A few minutes later, bombs exploded in two Churches of the GKI Diponegoro and Pentakosta Church. The next day, May 14, 2018, there was a suicide bomb explosion at Mapolresta Surabaya. After the series of Surabaya bomb attacks, the Republic of Indonesia Police have arrested 74 terrorists in six regions in Indonesia, and during the process of arrest, as many as 14 terrorists were declared dead (Ikhwanuddin, 2019).

In 2016, the Head of the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), Muhammad Tito
Karnavian, designated several areas as the "Red Zone of Terrorism in Indonesia." Some of these areas are Central Java, Aceh, Jakarta, Banten, West Java, East Java, East Kalimantan, North Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, Central Sulawesi, Bali, and Bima West Nusa Tenggara (NTB). The determination of the Red Zone was based on their involvement as Actors in several terrorism cases in Indonesia, and the intensity of the bomb terror in the region (kompas.com, 2016).

The study would highlight how the policy and its implementation in countering terrorism carried out by BNPT, Polri, and how the role of the community in supporting these efforts. The consideration in choosing Bima as a study location were:

First: Bima is one of the areas designated as the "Red Zone of Terrorism" in Indonesia. The second is in terms of the involvement of Bima citizens as terrorists in Indonesia. As revealed by the Central Sulawesi Police Chief, Birgjen Pol. Drs. Rudy Sufahriadi, there were seven out of nine who were included in the People's Search List (DPO) of Tinombala Operations Task Force, from Bima West Nusa Tenggara (NTB), namely Baroq aka Daus aka Rangga, Asgar aka Pak Guru, Abu Alim, Qatar aka Farel, Kholid, Galuh aka Nae, and Basir (metrotvnews.com, 2017).

West Nusa Tenggara Deputy Police Chief (NTB), Senior Police Commissioner Drs. Imam Margono also revealed that the three suspected terrorists who were secured by the Anti-Terrorism Detachment 88, along with their members on Saturday, June 17, 2017, came from Bima Regency, West Nusa Tenggara. Among them was Kurniawan bin Hamzah (23), who played the primary role in assembling bombs and conducting a survey of Mapolsek Woha (tempo.co, 2017).

Third, in terms of the activities of the Bima terrorist group, which is quite extensive, both in the Bima Region itself and in other regions in Indonesia, even in the Overseas. Ali Fauzi, who is the younger brother of Ali Imron convicted dead of the Bali Bombing, claimed that many Bima people were involved in terrorist groups, even when they first got to know the group in Malaysia, many knew Bima residents (kiblat.net, 2016).

Police General Prof. Muhammad Tito Karnavian, Ph.D., while serving as Head of the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) in 2016, revealed that terrorist groups would make the Bima area of West Nusa Tenggara as a safe base or goidah aminah (detik.news, 2016).

West Nusa Tenggara Regional Police Chief, Brig. Gen. Pol. Drs. Umar Septono revealed that the second wife of the Santoso terrorist member came from the City of Bima. Then, Penato'i Region is the center of hard-line Islamic activities (Igaras) whose ideology leads to violence and radicals. According to him, the potential of radicalism can become a time bomb in West Nusa Tenggara (kicknews.today, 2016).

**RESEARCH METHODS**

In this study, the paradigm used was Constructivism, arguing that the researcher would try to understand the meaning in which participants live. The researcher would engage in dialogue with participants in dialectics/hermeneutics in order to reveal the views of the participants about the situation being studied. Furthermore, researchers would construct a series of meanings found.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

A. Prevention of Terrorism in accordance with Law No. 5 of 2018, concerning the Criminal Acts of Terrorism.

Referring to Law Number 5 of 2018, concerning eradicating criminal acts of terrorism Article 43A that the Government is obliged to prevent the Criminal Act of Terrorism. To prevent terrorist acts, the Government takes continuous anticipatory steps based on the principles of protecting human rights and the precautionary principle. Prevention of criminal acts of terrorism is carried out through national preparedness programs, counter-radicalization, and deradicalization (Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, 2018).

As explained in Article 43B, National Preparedness is a condition of being prepared to anticipate the occurrence of Criminal Acts of Terrorism through a planned, integrated, systematic, and continuous process. National preparedness is carried out by the Government through the relevant Ministries/Institutions (K L), under the coordination of the body that organizes affairs in the field of countering terrorism. National preparedness is carried out through community empowerment, capacity building for the apparatus, protection, and improvement of infrastructure, development of Terrorism studies, and mapping of areas prone to a radical understanding of Terrorism (Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, 2018).

Counter-radicalization, as explained in Article 43C, is a planned, integrated, systematic, and continuous process carried out against people or groups of people who are vulnerable to being exposed to radical Terrorism intended to stop the spread of radical Terrorism. Counter radicalization is carried out by the Government, which is coordinated by a body that organizes affairs in the field of countering terrorism by involving the relevant ministries/institutions. Counter radicalization is done directly or indirectly through counter narration, counter-propaganda, or counter ideology (Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, 2018).

Deradicalization, as explained in Article 43D, is a planned, integrated, systematic, and continuous process carried out to eliminate or reduce and reverse the radical understanding of Terrorism that has occurred. Deradicalization is carried out on suspects, defendants, convicts, ex-convicts of Terrorism, people, or groups of people who have been exposed to radicalism and terrorism.

Deradicalisation is carried out by the Government, which is coordinated by a body that carries out affairs in the field of countering terrorism by involving relevant ministries/institutions. Deradicalization of suspects, defendants, convicts, and prisoners is given through the stages of identification and assessment, rehabilitation, reeducation, and social reintegration (Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, 2018).

Deradicalization of ex-convicts and persons or groups who have been exposed to radicalism and terrorism can be carried out through fostering a national insight, fostering religious insight, and/or entrepreneurship. Deradicalisation is carried out based on identification and evaluation.

In accordance with Article 43F, the National Counterterrorism Agency functions to compile and determine national policies, strategies, and programs in the area of counterterrorism; national coordinate policies, strategies, and programs in the area of countering terrorism; and
implementing national preparedness, counter-radicalization, and deradicalization (Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, 2018).

In carrying out this function, as explained in Article 43G, the National Counterterrorism Agency is tasked with formulating, coordinating, and implementing national policies, strategies, and programs to Counter-Terrorism in the areas of national preparedness, counter-radicalization, and deradicalization; coordinating between law enforcers in countering terrorism; coordinate the Victim recovery program; and formulating, coordinating, and implementing policies, strategies, and national programs to Counter-Terrorism in the field of international cooperation (Pemerintah Republik Indonesia, 2018).

B. Crime Prevention and Management

Efforts or policies to prevent and deal with crime include the field of "criminal policy." Even this criminal policy can not be separated from broader policies, namely social policies (social policy), which consists of policies or efforts for social welfare (social welfare policy) and policies or efforts to protect society (social defense policy) (Arief, 2007).

Thus, crime prevention policies (criminal politics), carried out by using the means of "penal" (criminal law), the criminal law policies (penal policy), especially at the stage of judicial or applicative policies (enforcement of criminal law in concreto) that must pay attention and lead on achieving the objectives of the social policy (Arief, 2007). Starting from the scheme, the main points in crime prevention and mitigation can be identified as follows:

a. Prevention and overcoming of crime must support the goals, namely community welfare and community protection. The most crucial aspect is immaterial, especially the value of trust, honesty/truth, and fairness.

b. Prevention and overcoming of crime must be done with an integral approach, namely the presence of penal and non-penal sentences. Viewed from the perspective of criminal politics, the most strategic policy is through non-penal means, because it is more preventive, while the policy of penal has many weaknesses that are more fragmental/simplistic or not structurally functional, symptomatic, not centralized/not eliminative; individualistic (not victim-oriented); more repressive and non-preventive; must be supported at a high cost.

c. Prevention and overcoming of crime by means of "penal" is "penal policy" or "penal law enforcement policy", which is functionalization or operationalization in several stages, namely the formulation stage (legislative policy), the applicative stage (judicial policy), and the execution stage (executive policy or administrative).

With the stage of formulation, the task of preventing and overcoming crime is not only the task of law enforcement officials but also the task of the legislative apparatus. Even the legislative policy is the most strategic policy of the penal policy (Arief, 2007).
DISCUSSION

A. Counter-Terrorism through Soft Approach

The results of an interview with one of the officials within the Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT), about the BNPT program and its implementation, explained that the program carried out was an implementation of the main task of the BNPT itself in preventing terrorism, through national preparedness programs, deradicalization, and counter-radicalization in Bima. He said as the following:

“Ada beberapa program Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT) dalam rangka kesiapsiagaan nasional, kontra radikalisasi dan deradikalisasi, diantaranya rencana untuk mendirikan pesantren moderen, pembuatan Pusat media damai, pembinaan terhadap aparat Pemda, TNI, Polri dan masyarakat serta mengirim Polisi dan TNI sebagai Da’i di wilayah yang sudah terpapar radikalisme.”

"There are several programs of the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) in the framework of national preparedness, counter-radicalization, and de-radicalization, including plans to establish a modern boarding school, the creation of a peaceful media center, fostering the apparatus of the Regional Government, the TNI (Indonesian national army), the Police, and the community and sending the Police and TNI as Da’i in an area that has been exposed to radicalism."

It was supported by information from the Head of the BNPT General Bureau, Brigjen TNI Dada Hendrayudha, that to counter radicalization through cyberspace, BNPT is currently building a Media Center for Peace. These efforts were made to prevent the use of cyberspace for propaganda by terrorist groups (bnpt.go.id).

BNPT also compiled books in order to counter the narrative of jihad, as the results of an interview with one of the religious leaders in Bima, as follows:

“Saya bersama BNPT sedang meneliti untuk menulis buku tentang surat dalam Al-Qur’an yang sering disalah gunakan oleh mereka dalam menyebar konsep jihad. Kami ingin memperbaiki umat, mengajak mereka kepada Islam yang benar. Memperbaiki paham ekstrimis/radikal, yaitu paham yang menghalalkan darah sesame.”

"I and BNPT are researching to write a book about surahs in the Qur’an, which are often misused by them in spreading the concept of jihad. We want to repair the public, invite them to the true Islam. Fixing extremism.radicalism that is the understanding that justifies (halal) the blood of others.

In order to strengthen the program of de-radicalization and counterradicalism, BNPT held a socialization and coordination meeting with elements of the National Police, the TNI, and the Regional Government. It is as said by community leaders, as follows:

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“BNPT beberapa kali mengadakan pertemuan dengan unsur Pemda, Polres dan TNI terkait pemantapan program deradikalisasi dan kontra radikalisis. Selain itu, kami pernah membantu BNPT mengadakan acara seminar tentang penanggulangan radikalisme, yang diikuti oleh komponen masyarakat, Pemda, Polri dan TNI.” (Interviews results with Respondent N (Bima, 3 April 2019 at 20.00 West Indonesia Time)

"BNPT has held several meetings with elements of the Regional Government, Polres, and the TNI related to the consolidation of the de-radicalization and counter-radicalization programs. In addition, we have also helped BNPT hold a seminar on combating radicalism, which was attended by components of the community, local government, police, and military.

Other de-radicalization activities include organizing training and entrepreneurship training and providing business capital to ex-prisoners and families of terrorist suspects who have died. As the results of the interview with the ex-members of the Jamaah Asharout Tawhid, as follow:

“Dalam upaya deradikalisasi, kami pernah mengikuti program pelatihan kewirausahaan yang diadakan oleh BNPT. Selain pelatihan, kami juga diberikan modal usaha.”

"To deradicalize, we have participated in an entrepreneurship training program organized by BNPT. In addition to training, we are also given venture capital."

It was conveyed by one of the members of the National Police that he, together with the Village Development Board and Village Head, had followed the guidance from the BNPT on the methods of deradicalization and counter radicalism. According to him, the activity was held in Mataram last July. The result of the interview is as follows:

“Kami pernah mengikuti pelatihan bersama 1 orang Bhabinkamtibmas, 2 Babinsa dan 2 Kades. Materi yang kami terima adalah tentang pola penanggulangan radikalisme dan terorisme, yaitu deradikalisasi dan kontra radikalisme dengan cara pendekatan persuasif. Kami dapat memahami materi yang disampaikan, namun sedikit yang kami rasakan kurang adalah belum adanya materi tentang teknis mendekati pelaku.”

"We have participated in training with one person from Bhabinkamtibmas, two people from Babinsa, and two Village Heads. The material we received was about the pattern of overcoming radicalism and terrorism, namely deradicalization and counter radicalism, employing a persuasive approach. We can understand the material presented, but what we feel is lacking is the lack of technical material to approach the perpetrators."

Terrorism prevention efforts are also supported by the District Police of Bima, as the results of an interview with one member of the National Police, as follows:

“Dalam upaya penanggulangan radikalisme dan terorisme, Polres Kabupaten Bima melakukan penggalangan terhadap tokoh-tokoh agama yang sudah masuk dalam jaringan dan melakukan
To tackle radicalism and terrorism, the Bima District Police Station mobilizes religious leaders who have entered the network and counteracts people who have not been exposed to radicalism. Bhayangkari also helped to guide Islamic boarding schools and approached the perpetrators' families.

The Bima Kota Regional Police conducted efforts to deradicalize and counter radicalism through community development and supporting creative economic development programs. It was revealed through the results of an interview with one of the members of Bhabinkamtibmas, as follows:


"Pena To'i Bhabinkamtibmas activities in order to prevent the development of radicalism is to guide the community. I support the Local Government's program in empowering the community or youth groups, through providing creative economic venture capital. The Chief of Police also conducts direct training to mosques and mushollah by giving lectures and appeals. Then, every week, it is scheduled for each mosque/mushollah in Penato'i during prayer together in the congregation."

Counter-radicalization activities by the City Bima Police, revealed by the Head of Community Development Unit of the Bima Kota Police, as follows:


"Bima City Police Satbinmas continues to carry out the promotion, coaching, and persuasive approach, among others, provide legal counseling to the community, the foremost youth leaders when they hold religious activities, and perform congregational prayers with them. The City of
Bima Police Chief held a Friday prayer together at one of the mosques in Penato’i. The following week Kasat Sabhara and its members prayed at the Istiqomah mosque. Satbinmas, together with the Religious Communication Forum (FKUB), invited religious leaders, including them (radical groups). In addition, I also coordinate with the Ministry of Religion, related to the handling of their recitation places that developed into Islamic Boarding Schools."

It was supported by the Head of the Ministry of Religion in the City of Bima, as the results of the interview, as follows:

“Kemenag Bima Kota melakukan pemantauan kegiatan Pondok pesantren, utamanya terkait dengan ijin operasional dan melakukan seleksi yang ketat terhadap syarat mendirikan Ponpes.”

"The Ministry of Religion in the City of Bima Kota monitored the activities of Islamic boarding schools, mainly related to operational permits, and conducted a rigorous selection of the requirements for establishing Islamic Boarding Schools."

In order to support the de-radicalization program, some community leaders in Bima Kota approached the Radical group through discussion activities to equalize perceptions about jihad. The results of the interview are as follows:


"We form construction activities as if we draw them like pulling the thread in flour. First, we see from what side they are different from most Muslims that from the human side, we are both human beings as servants of Allah SWT, but on the understanding side is different. We discussed for one week at the Religious Harmony Forum (FKUB), so we found one format. We bring together moderate flow with the radial flow in one place. Ustad Jaidon, as the Head of JAT Pena To’i, from MUI, was represented by the Deputy Chairperson, Ustadz H. Admin Mdi. And other Islamic organizations such as Muhammmadyah, NU, and others. The topic of discussion raised was the format of jihad. With the conclusion that the concept of jihad is basically the same, but the implementation is different. The next step is to do coffee morning and involve them in various activities."

The same thing was done by religious leaders in Bima Kota, namely communication efforts.
and inviting radical groups in various activities, in order to increase love for the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. The results of the interview are as follows:

“Upaya tomas melakukan upaya dialog dengan JAT dalam rangka penyamaan persepsi tentang fikih jihad. Upaya tersebut membuka hasil berupa terbukanya komunikasi para jamaah. Selain komunikasi, tomas melibatkan kegiatan yang berskala nasional, misalnya kegiatan bela islam untuk meningkatkan integritas NKRI.”

"Thomas's efforts to conduct a dialogue with JAT are in order to equalize perception of the jihad fiqh. These efforts bore fruit in the form of open communication among worshipers. In addition to communication, Thomas involves activities on a national scale, such as Islamic activities, to improve the integrity of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia."

The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) of Bima Kota Regency takes a persuasive approach and often provides guidance to radical groups, as the results of the interview, as follows:

“Mereka (kelompok radikal dan terorisme) sering datang silaturrahmi ke saya dan minta saran pendapat. Saya menyarankan agar melakukan dakwah. Karena saya sering komunikasi dengan mereka, sayapun dicurigai mengikuti JAT. Saya mendekati mereka untuk mencari cara memberi pemahaman kepada mereka agar tidak melakukan tindakan kekerasan. Saya berusaha meredam cara berpikir mereka yang cenderung keras. Yang sulit ditangani adalah yang ada di Penato’i, karena agak keras walaupun cenderung keras. Yang sulit ditangani adalah yang ada di Penato’i, karena agak keras walaupun jumlahnya kecil.”

"They (radical groups and terrorism) often come silaturrahmi to me and ask for opinions. I suggest doing da'wah. Because I often communicate with them, I am also suspected of following JAT. I approached them to look for ways to give them understanding not to act violently. I try to reduce the way of thinking of those who tend to be hard. What is hard to handle is the one in Penato’i, because it is a bit hard even though the numbers are small.

The BNPT program in rebuilding Islamic Boarding Schools and Flats and various other programs has had a positive impact on Islamic Boarding Schools. The indication is that the Boarding School on August 17, 2019, had a flag ceremony. Whereas, before in the last few decades, they had never done it. It was revealed in an interview with one of the Boarding School caregivers who had been one of the bases of radicalism and terrorism in Bima Regency, as follows:

"Alhamdullillah in Bima, in the past two years, there has been no more conflict due to the pattern of approaches to religious scholars and religious leaders in Bima and the government approaching various activities including conducting recitals, Islamic boarding schools a day, and Tabliq. Then, BNPT has rebuilt our damaged Islamic boarding school and is currently building a Flats. It is very positive for us."

However, the de-radicalization program is not without gaps, and the coaching activities carried out have not yet fully touched the families of the former perpetrators. The label of a terrorist family is still felt and a feeling of trauma towards the actions of the Police during the process of the arrest of their families, leaving the desire to join the terrorist group as a place of revenge against the Police. The results of an interview with one family convicted of terrorism are as follows:

"Sampai saat ini tidak ada pendekatan atau pembinaan terhadap keluarga pelaku. Dirasakan bahwa label keluarga teroris terhadap mereka sangat kuat dari masyarakat, sehingga menyulitkan mereka menyuatu dengan masyarakat. Hal ini dapat memunculkan keinginan untuk tetap menjadi teroris karena putus asa terhadap label tersebut, sebagaimana yang dialami oleh "Am" anak kedua saya."

"Until now, there has been no approach or guidance for the perpetrators' families. It was felt that the label of the terrorist family against them was powerful from the community, making it difficult for them to become one with the community. It can lead to the desire to remain a terrorist out of desperation for the label, as experienced by "Am" my second child."

Another de-radicalization program that is still felt to be lacking is economic development activities for ex-terrorist inmates, as experienced by M. Nasir from Bolo District, Bima Regency. Until now, he had difficulty finding venture capital since leaving prison. It is related to the emergence of despair and disappointment towards the government so that it does not rule out the possibility of having an impact on his return with his group. It is as the result of an interview with one of M. Nasir's neighbors, as follows:

"Tentang program dari BNPT, dirasakan cukup positif, namun ada yang belum berjalan maksimal yaitu pembangunan pesantren moderen dan membinaan ekonomi kreatif bagi mantan napiter, sebagaimana yang dialami Nasir. Sampai saat ini dia kesulitan dalam mencari sumber dana untuk mengembangkan usaha perbaikan Hendphonenya."

"Regarding the program from BNPT, it is felt quite positive, but there is something that has not been running optimally, namely the development of a modern pesantren and fostering a creative economy for ex-terrorist inmates, as experienced by Nasir. Until now, he has difficulty in finding sources of funds to develop his handphone repair business."

From the several descriptions above, it implies that overcoming terrorism through a flexible approach is quite effective in suppressing the growth of radicalism and terrorism and restoring the love of community groups who have been exposed to radicalism and terrorism. However, this step
has not been optimal in counter-radicalization and deradicalization of the families of terrorist prisoners or families of terrorists who have died in the process of law enforcement.

B. Counter Terrorism through the Legal Approach (Hard Approach)

According to one member of the Jamaah Asharoud Daulah (JAD) Bima, the law enforcement steps by the Detachment 88 AT Polri were right on target but were still felt to be disproportionate because there were several perpetrators who were paralyzed without a situation threatening the officers. The results of the interview are as follows:

"Penanganan yang dilakukan sudah tepat sasaran, yang ditangkap selama ini memang pelaku, sementara aktor intelektual seperti saya tidak ditangkap. Namun harapannya sebelum dilakukan penangkapan, sebaiknya dilakukan pendekatan terhadap tokoh-tokoh agar pelaku menyerahkan diri. Selain itu, hendaknya petugas memperhatikan dan memaklumi kondisi pelaku. Sebagaimana saat penangkapan Nurdin dan Fajar, mereka ditembak tanpa ada perlawanan. Sebagai pengayom masyarakat sebaiknya tidak melakukan itu."

"The treatment that has been carried out is right on target, the people arrested have been the perpetrators, while intellectual actors like me have not been arrested. Nevertheless, his hope before the arrest, an approach should be made to the leaders so that the perpetrators' surrender. In addition, officers should pay attention to and understand the conditions of the perpetrators. As during the arrests of Nurdin and Fajar, they were shot without resistance. As a protector of the community, you should not do that."

The statement was in line with the results of interviews with other former JAT members, as follows:

"Terkait dengan penangan oleh Densus 88 AT Polri, hendaknya memperhatikan aspek sosial dan budaya dan aspek kemanusiaan. Sebagaimana penangkapan yang dilakukan terhadap Nurdin, dia dilumpuhkan saat tidak memegang senjata apapun."

"Related to the handling by Detachment 88 AT Polri, it should pay attention to social and cultural aspects and humanitarian aspects. Like the arrest of Nurdin, he was incapacitated while not holding any weapons."

As a result of the Detachment 88's actions, according to one official in the Bima Regency government, it will cause resentment from his children and family, as the results of the interview, as follows:

"Eksekusi yang dilakukan Densus 88 AT Polri akan menimbulkan dendam dan sikap radikal bagi anak dan keluarganya. Sebaiknya penanganan dapat dilakukan dengan soft approach, sebagaimana yang dilakukan oleh BNPT."
"The execution carried out by Detachment 88 AT Polri will lead to revenge and a radical attitude for the child and his family. Handling should be done with a flexible approach, as is done by BNPT."

The statement was supported by one of the terrorist prisoner's wives, the current treatment of the law apparatus against her and her husband, leaving revenge, and arousing the spirit of jihad in the family, especially her children, as the results of the interview, as follows:


"My husband ran away because he heard that there were police officers telling the public that Ustadz Jb would be killed. It is hoped that there will be no violence against the perpetrators' families because it will cause frustration and confusion for the family. Currently, the second child is Ust. Jabar (Am) really hates the police, because of trauma to the actions of the authorities to his family. Expected not to prioritize violence, but there needs to be an approach first. In addition, it is expected that the treatment of the family of the offender is not like the treatment of the offender, because they do not understand what the husband’s problem is. In addition, acts of violence received by the perpetrators' families can arouse morale and revenge for the perpetrators' families, especially if the perpetrators have children who witnessed the incident."

Religious leaders in Bima Kota, who are the former Commander of Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) of Nusra region, considered that harsh and disproportionate measures would not be too effective in countering radicalism and terrorism. It will even tend to strengthen the doctrine of jihad. According to him, there needs to be an approach through the social and cultural community. It is as the results of the interview with, as follows:


"Repressive treatment does not provide benefits at all. Even making them angrier, more vengeful, and they are not more afraid, they are even bolder, the stronger the doctrine is. For them, the actions
of the authorities are proof that the government is hostile to them and wants to burn them down. If they want to change, of course, with a socio-cultural approach, involve them in social activities. However, it must be acknowledged that in the last two years, there have been no acts of terrorism in Bima."

It was supported by a statement from one of the speakers, who said that his 3-year-old niece was aspiring to be a mujahideen in order to kill the Police because the Police had killed Muslims. It is as the results of the interview, as follows:

"Saya pernah tanya kepada keponakan saya yang tinggal di Penato’i yang usianya baru 3 (tiga) tahun tentang cita-citanya, dia menjawab ingin menjadi mujahidin untuk membunuh Polisi karena Polisi telah membunuh umat islam. Kemudian saya suruh dia tinggal di rumah untuk beberapa hari biar saya bisa mengarahkan dia kembali."

"I once asked my nephew who lives in Penato'i, who was only 3 (three) years old about his ideals, he said he wanted to become mujahidin to kill the police because the police had killed Muslims. Then, I told him to stay at home for a few days so I could redirect him."

Another informant from the Police also said that children of the same age had asked the police who were praying at one of the mosques in Bima about the truth of the use of Polri weapons to shoot Muslims. The results of the interview are as follows:

"Pada saat khotbah jum’at, mereka melihat Polisi membawa senjata. Mereka berpesan agar Polisi tidak berpura-pura sholat, pura-pura baik dihadapan mereka tapi di belakang mereka Polisi berbuat tidak baik. Pada saat itu ada seorang anak kecil yang kira-kira baru berusia 3 (Tiga) tahun bertanya kepada Kasat Sabhara sambil memegang senjata yang dibawa oleh anggota Sabhara, ”om, apa senjata ini digunakan untuk menembak orang muslim juga ? . Kasat Sabhara menjawab bahwa senjata ini digunakan untuk menembak menjangan, kemudian salah seorang anggota Polisi menggendong anak tersebut. Mereka nampak marah ketika melihat anaknya digendong oleh Polisi.”

During the Friday sermon, they saw the police carrying weapons. They advised the police not to pretend to pray, to pretend to be good in front of them, but behind them, the police did no good. At that time, there was a small child who was only about 3 (three) years of age asking the Kasat Sabhara while holding a weapon carried by members of Sabhara, "uncle, is this weapon used to shoot Muslims too? Kasat Sabhara answered that this weapon was used to shoot the deer, then one of the police officers carried the child. They look angry when they see their child carried by the police."

In addition, there was former terrorist inmate who had rejoined the terrorist group at the instigation of their first wife, who was still holding a grudge against the National Police who shot other terrorists on behalf of Nurdin. It is as the results of the interview with the members of Bhabinkamtibmas, as follow:
“Di Mangge nae ada eks napiter yang bernama Asrak. Dia sebenarnya sudah sadar dan kami bersama perangkat lain telah melakukan pendekatan. Dia kembali bergabung karena pengaruh istrinya yang pertama karena istrinya masih dendam atas penembakan yang dilakukan Polisi terhadap saudaranya di O’o. Selama satu tahun terakhir jarang ada di rumah, kabarnya mengikuti pelatihan di Bima.”

"In Mangge nae, there is a former terrorist inmate named Asrak. He was already conscious, and we, along with other instruments, had taken an approach. He rejoined because of his first wife's influence because his wife was still vengeful for the police shooting of her brother in O’o. For the past year, I have rarely been home, reportedly following training in Bima."

An official confirmed it at Detachment 88 AT Polri that to uphold the law against terrorism perpetrators, Detachment 88 Anti-Terror Police conducted an analysis of the situation and socio-cultural conditions of the community and took a persuasive approach, before taking decisive action. Nevertheless, it was realized that in the implementation of law enforcement, there were still some people who oppose or refuse when strict action was taken. According to him, it happened because the suspect was in the middle of a society that had been exposed to radicalism, and they portrayed themselves as good, obedient, and modest Muslim figures. The public did not know that they were suspected of committing terrorism. Enforcement of criminal acts of terrorism has a high difficulty (extraordinary crime) because the suspect wants to die as syahid. It is as the results of the interview, as follows:

“Sebelum pelaksanaan penegakan hukum oleh Densus 88 Anti Teror Polri terhadap seseorang yang diduga pelaku atau tersangka tindak pidana terorisme, terlebih dahulu dilakukan kajian yang mendalam. Timbula penolakan oleh masyarakat, karena tersangka berada pada lingkungan yang telah terpapar radikalisme atau karena mereka mencitrakan dirinya sebagai orang baik, interaksi sosial bagus dengan karakter yang simpatik serta menyembunyikan identitasnya yang sebenarnya, sehingga pada saat dilakukan penggerebekan, masyarakat kaget karena menduga bahwa Densus 88 menangkap orang Islam yang baik dan tidak bersalah. Penegakkan hukum terorisme memiliki tingkat kesulitan yang sangat tinggi karena tujuan akhir dari anggota terorisme adalah mati syahid, sehingga peluang untuk negosiasi sangat kecil.”

"Before the implementation of law enforcement by the Detachment 88 Anti-Terror Police toward a person suspected of perpetrators or suspects in a criminal act of terrorism, an in-depth study must first be conducted. The emergence of rejection by the community, because the suspect is in an environment that has been exposed to radicalism or because they portrayed themselves as good people, good social interaction with a sympathetic character, and hide their true identity, so that when the raids were carried out, the community was shocked because they suspected that Detachment 88 captured good and innocent Muslims. Enforcement of terrorism law has a very high level of difficulty because the ultimate goal of terrorism members is to be syahid, so there is almost no chance to negotiate."
It is in line with the explanation from one member of the Bima District Police Station. According to him, Detachment 88 AT had made persuasive efforts before taking decisive action, but these efforts were unsuccessful due to their low trust in the authorities, as the results of the interview, as follows:

“Dalam melakukan pendekatan persuasif terhadap pelaku tindak pidana terorisme, Densus 88 AT pernah meminta bantuan Polres kabupaten Bima untuk menggalang keluarga agar menyerahkan diri, sebagaimana yang dilakukan terhadap Ustad Salahudin (DPO Poso). Namun Salahudin tidak siap karena masih ragu dengan upaya tersebut dan menganggap upaya tersebut hanya sebuah jebakan yang berujung pada penembakan.”

"In carrying out a persuasive approach to the perpetrators of criminal acts of terrorism, Detachment 88 AT once requested the assistance of the Bima district police to mobilize families to surrender, as was done with Ustad Salahudin (Poso DPO). However, Salahudin was not ready because he was still unsure of the effort and considered the effort only a trap that led to the shooting."

Although there are still negative responses to the approach of law by the National Police, some people support this step. These efforts were felt to be quite successful in suppressing the terror incident in the last two years. One of the community leaders Pena To'i Bima explained that the community supported the law enforcement measures by Detachment 88 AT because the perpetrators had ruined people's lives. The results of the interview are as follows:

“Terhadap tindakan Densus saja-saja, karena kelompok tersebut telah merusak masyarakat umum. Hanya perlu selektif, teliti dan tidak salah sasaran. Dampak dari penegakan hukum yang tegas, dirasakan dalam dua tahun terakhir didak ada kejadian terror di Bima.”

"The Densus's actions are legitimate because the group has damaged the general public. They only need to be selective, thorough, and not wrongly targeted. The impact of strict law enforcement has been felt in the past two years that there have been no terrorist incidents in Bima."

It was also conveyed by an official at the Bima Regency government. He said that, in the last two years, the Bima region was quite conducive and there were no terror incidents, either to the authorities or the wider community.

“Dampak dari ditangkapnya beberapa pelaku terror yang berasal dari Bima, dalam dua tahun terakhir tidak ada kejadian terror di Bima.”

"The impact of the arrest of several terrorists who came from Bima, in the last two years, there have been no incidents of terror in Bima."

From the description above, it implies that overcoming terrorism through a hard-legal approach has implications for increasing security and order in the Bima community because there has been no terror action during the last two years. However, many people argue that the approach
of the law carried out will lead to the development of new radicalism and terrorism. It is possible because of the increasing doctrine of *jihad* among the terrorist members themselves and their families, and the increasing sense of empathy of some Bima residents who have the same thought.

**CONCLUSION**

From the various descriptions of countering terrorism in Bima, as one of the regions categorized as the red zone of terrorism in Indonesia above, it can be concluded as follows:

*First*: the soft approach taken in countering terrorism is quite effective in suppressing the growth of radicalism and terrorism in Bima, which is one of the areas designated as the red zone of terrorism in Indonesia. However, some programs have not yet touched on various aspects of the problem.

*Second*: the legal approach (hard approach) is quite effective in improving security and public order as well as suppressing acts of terrorism in Bima in the past two years. However, the legal approach (hard approach), is believed to be ineffective in preventing the growth of radicalism and terrorism. It is even feared it could lead to the growth of new radicalism and terrorism due to increased solidarity among some Bima residents and the families of the perpetrators and an increase in the value of *jihad* in them.

*Third*: Counterterrorism, which is done through a legal approach (hard approach) and soft approach (soft approach), is still not well integrated and even tends to be done partially. It has led to the emergence of negative opinions in the community towards law enforcement efforts, and the lack of early prevention of the development of radicalism in the families of perpetrators.
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