COMPARISON COGNITIVE IDENTITY BETWEEN HONGKONG CITIZENS AND CHINESE DIASPORA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Zhang Guannan
No.1 Yucai Road, Ji Yang District, San Ya, Hai Nan Province, China
yantozhangguannan@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

In this paper, my topic is related to the cognitive identity case in Hong Kong. To research this topic, the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia will also be discussed and compared to illustrate what factors may caused the case occurred in Hong Kong. The topic of this paper will be discussed in terms of historical development, with this comparison, I will explain how the historical development of cognitive identity in Hong Kong from the colonial era to the present. Meanwhile, unlike the case of Hong Kong which is disappearing their cognitive identity which is national identity in China, there are Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia who still consider themselves as the successors of Chinese culture. With this comparison, I want to find a solution to avoid cases like this that occur in Hong Kong so that the cognitive problem of identity of people who has followed the Hong Kong case will also be changed and also truly be considered their identity as Chinese citizen. To research this topic, I will use the literature review method.

KEYWORDS: Cognitive of Identity, Hong Kong Case, Diaspora, History

INTRODUCTION

With the development of protests in Hong Kong in 2019, also as known as the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill (or Anti-ELAB) movement, the protests has been lasted for over six months and eventually has become an international issue with international intervention. In other words, this case is belongs to Chinese internal affairs at the beginning, but with the intervention with other countries and international media. The Hong Kong protests has been become a unconquerable puzzle for local government in Hong Kong and central government in Mainland China. However, the most important factor to make a huge influence on the protests is lack of national identity from Hong Kong people. This case is not only just protest the Anti-ELAB law, but also has become an Anti-China movement. Frankly speaking, not all Hong Kong people involved in this movement, most of those protesters are from young generation. There are students, office employees, freelancers and so on. They played a critical role in this movement, on the one hand, they are the backbone to the protests, on the other hand, they also teared down many kinds of facilities like MRT transportation, CCTV system, road traffic network and etc. Not only that, they also used gasoline bomb against Hong Kong police and beat up other innocent citizen and policemen during this so called “protest”. Until now, the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill (or Anti-ELAB) movement has been developed to another level, it’s not a formal protest, it has been exploded as a severe riot in Hong Kong island. With the expansion of the protests to become the riot in Hong Kong, those protesters are considered as Chinese citizens who are not have enough
national feelings or lack of national identity as Chinese. Compared with this case, those Chinese diaspora are far from this country still concerned about the development of their motherland, especially for the old generation diaspora. Taken an example in Indonesia, in Indonesia, there is about 3% to 5% of population is Chinese diaspora nowadays. Chinese diaspora in Indonesia has given a huge support on construction of China economy in 1980s, at that time, they still considered as China as their motherland despite they were in another country. Maybe now they have changed the way they show the national identity to China, but somehow, they still save the reserved habits to prove that they are influenced by the identity from China until today. Through this paper, I will discuss and make a comparison between the Hong Kong case and Chinese diaspora in Indonesia to draw a conclusion and find out the solutions to solve the Hong Kong case.

ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF HONG KONG CASE

In February 2018, a Hong Kong citizen Chen Tongjia killed his girlfriend Pan Xiaoying in Taiwan and abandoned his body in Taipei with his suitcase. Because the man has returned to Hong Kong, the Hong Kong police cannot sue for murder, which has caused heated discussion among network citizens. Compared with Hong Kong, which has signed long-term extradition agreements with 20 countries, the murder case has led to loopholes in mutual legal assistance between Hong Kong and Taiwan. In February 2019, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Government promoted the revised draft of the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance in response to the murder case, stating that the revised regulations were designed to fill the judicial loopholes and prevent Hong Kong from becoming a "flight paradise". According to Xin Hua said, "The Hong Kong SAR Government has proposed this amendment to deal with the murders that took place in Taiwan last year and to plug the loopholes in the overall criminal cooperation system in Hong Kong. The amendment of the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance can establish inter-regional judicial assistance relations. The proper meaning of the Basic Law is an important measure to safeguard the core values of the rule of law in Hong Kong and to consolidate the image of a good rule of law in Hong Kong." However, once the draft amendment was put forward, it caused a heated debate. The first to come out against is the business and legal profession in Hong Kong. In the original draft amendments, 46 of the handover offenses were involved. Some of them were related to commercial crimes. The business sector considered that this might affect the business environment in Hong Kong. It is recommended that the Hong Kong Government should remove commercial offenses. At the end of March, after listening to the views from the business community, the Hong Kong Government removed nine commercial and personal crimes (including bankruptcy, securities and futures, infringement, computer crimes, etc.) and sentenced the extradition threshold to more than one year in prison for public prosecution increase up to three years or more.

However, the situation has not developed in the right direction, but has deteriorated rapidly. The revised "Fugitive Offenders Ordinance" should have been debated in the Legislative Council on Second Reading on June 12, but on June 9, a million people marched in Hong Kong. The organizers of the parade are the "Hong Kong Civil Rights Front". They spread the news that once the newly revised "Fugitive Offenders Ordinance" is passed, the Central Government will use the scope of the ordinance to arbitrarily arrest and extradite people in Hong Kong to be extradited. People have been subjected to unfair trials, making the fugitive offenders a tool for political suppression. At the same time, the Hong Kong Bar Association, the Law Society and a number of
religious groups have issued statements against the amendments. Because of this setting background, on June 9, almost one million people in Hong Kong took to the streets and opposed the amendments. Hundreds of them destroyed the parking lot gates of the Legislative Council and rushed into the Legislative Council Demonstration area, during that time, so many police officers were injured.

On June 15, the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, Mrs Carrie Lam, announced that the amendments had been suspended. They called on all sectors of the community to resume calm as soon as possible and to prevent further law enforcement officers and members of the public from being harmed. The misleading from the organization "Hong Kong Civil Rights Front" is called as the beginning of this movement, even many people who involved in this case did not know what the new regulations are. Actually, The new regulations have multiple guarantees on the terms: 1. Criminals who apply to the transfer to the Mainland must be guilty of 37 internationally recognized criminals with a term of seven years or more. 2. The transfer must be implemented after the approval of the SAR court and the chief executive. 3. The regulations clearly stipulate that there are “eight untransfers”—non-transfers that do not meet the principle of “double criminality”, non-transfer of political crimes, non-transfer of death sentences, and no involvement in acts of journalism, speech, academics, publications, etc. Therefore, it will not affect the freedom of the press and freedom of speech in Hong Kong. But some Hong Kong people are worried that once Article 23 of the Basic Law (the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China) is passed, the future mainland will extradite dissidents from Hong Kong on political charges such as subversion of state crimes or espionage crimes to harm freedom of speech in Hong Kong. This is a provision on national security, but when it was consulted in 2003, it was opposed by 500,000 people. The organizers of the parade were also the "Hong Kong Folk Rights Front". They appealed to the Hong Kong people to oppose the 23rd legislation on the grounds of deprivation of human rights and freedom of speech. After the parade, the former Chief Executive of Hong Kong, Tung Chee-hwa, subsequently announced that he would withdraw the 23rd draft legislation.

Starting from June 15th, this demonstration in Hong Kong began to change and evolve in the direction of violence. The landmark event was that the policeman’s finger was bitten off by a mob from demonstrators. Just after Hong Kong government announced cessation of the amendments, the "Hong Kong Civil Rights Front" not only required the complete withdrawal of the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance (previously suspended), but also wanted the Chief Executive of Hong Kong to step down. On June 21st, demonstrators surrounded the police headquarters and blocked the entrances and exits. They set up roadblocks with iron wire, blocked major traffic roads nearby, threw eggs at the police headquarters, and used lasers to illuminate police officers. During the period, because the road was blocked, the ambulance could not enter, and pregnant women were trapped for several hours before being taken to the hospital. On June 26, the demonstrators once again surrounded the police headquarters and removed the "Hong Kong Police Headquarters" plaque. The Longshiqi flag was used by the British colonial Hong Kong. When the Dragon and Lion flag was hung on the Legislative Council’s rostrum, the purpose of this demonstration has completely changed. In the process of obstructing the flag raising and impacting the Legislative Council, the demonstrators attacked the front line of police station in different ways, including using chemicals production as weapons, causing serious injuries to several police officers. Besides
this, many of protesters started hold English flag and American flag to demonstrate Hong Kong should step aside from mainland and be controlled by the UK or the USA.

By now, this movement totally has become its essence. Many politics experts predict that this demonstration may get assistance from outside, such as CIA, NED, western media and other secret organizations from foreign countries.

According to the "Ta Kung Pao" report, the on-site thugs were highly organized and had different divisions. Some people used the walkie-talkie to communicate. Some people called to discuss the deployment. Some people wore helmets to move the iron horses. Some people made paint bombs on the spot and some people equipped the equipment. After the mob, the so-called declaration was published in Cantonese and English outside the Liaison Office building, saying that the establishment of the "Provisional Legislative Council" was not ruled out. In fact, there have been rumors that the demonstrations triggered by the anti-reforms have continued to evolve in the direction of violence because there are external forces behind them. Initially, there were a number of foreigners who held walkie-talkies and black people (the demonstrators all dressed in black) to conduct command and liaison, and the means of these people were very professional. They deliberately took down the surveillance cameras and put them down, cut the line. On the side of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it was originally ordered to warn certain countries not to interfere in Hong Kong affairs. Until July 30, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying directly named US, said it was a ‘work’ from US government. On the same day, the People’s Daily published an article exposing evidence from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) to support Hong Kong’s opposition and Hong Kong independence demonstrators. People’s Daily said that among the organizations of the "Hong Kong Folk Rights Front", including the Hong Kong Institute of Human Resource Management, the Hong Kong of Trade Unions, the Hong Kong Association of Journalists, the Citizens' Party, the Labour Party, the Democratic Party, etc., these organizations have one thin thing in common which is all of them have received money from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). Actually, since the 90s, NED has been funding these organizations in Hong Kong for a long time. According to NED Chairman Carl Gushman, the purpose of the organization was to do some inconvenient public operations for the CIA, in other words, NED as a social organization which is essentially working for the CIA.

Except for assistance from western found organization, this riot in Hong Kong also was misleading by western media such as CNN, BBC and other broadcasting companies. Basically speaking, some of news are made up from these media companies. For example, in the case of a mob snapping a policeman's finger, the New York Times reported that the police officer was partially biting off when he used his fingers to dig the eyes of the protesters. This statement is neither in line with the arguments of the defense in the court, nor does it conform to the prosecution’s statement. It is obviously the editor from reporter. in addition to this, western media also gives double standard to report the case in Hong Kong. They often give critical evaluation to what police done in this fake demonstration, said how the police man beat up protesters and advise police officer being humane. But on the other hand, those media dose not give any critical comments on the yellow vests movement from France. In that movement, eleven people were killed by French police, thousands of citizens were injured during that movement.
LACK OF NATIONAL IDENTITY FOR HONG KONG PEOPLE

Even if there are foreign forces behind the movement, this are only external factors. In fact, the Hong Kong case has developed into such an awkward situation, internal factors is the decisive factor. In my opinion, internal factors are mainly at two levels: one is the problems left by British colonization, and the other one which is the most important one is that the cognitive problem of national identity of people in Hong Kong, especially the younger generation.

The Qing government was forced to slay the "Nanjing Treaty" in August 1842, officially ceding Hong Kong Island to the United Kingdom. Subsequently, in 1860, the Chinese and British signed the "Beijing Treaty", the Qing government ceded the southern end of the Kowloon Peninsula to the British side; in 1898, the Qing government was forced to sign the "Exhibition of the Hong Kong boundary site", north of the Kowloon Peninsula, Shenzhen River The south and adjacent 200 islands are zoned "New Territories" and leased to the UK for 99 years. So far, the entire territory of Hong Kong has completely become a British colony since 1898. Until 1997, Hong Kong's jurisdiction has not changed.

Since the occupation of Hong Kong in 1842, the United Kingdom has adopted a highly centralized political system. The Hong Kong Governor appointed by the Queen of England has a combination of administrative, legislative and military powers. It is at the top of the pyramidal power structure and has obvious authoritarianism. As a "democratic function" institution in the establishment of the British Hong Kong Government, the recommendations made by the Executive Council and the Legislative Council do not constitute any legal restrictions on the Governor. Chinese who account for 98% of Hong Kong's population have long been unable to enjoy equal citizenship and political participation. This kind of tradition has been continued today in Hong Kong’s judiciary. The judiciary in Hong Kong has long been controlled by liberal judges, and most of these liberal judges have foreign nationality. Of the appointments of permanent and non-permanent judges of the new Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal in 2016, only 2 of the 17 judges are Hong Kong citizens, and the rest are foreign nationality or dual nationality. Therefore, those protesters who admit crime during Hong Kong case will be released immediately or given light punishment.

As early as the 1880s, the United Kingdom implemented compulsory primary education. The Education Act of 1918 enacted the age of compulsory education as 14 years old. The Education Law, amended in 1944, stipulates that all primary and secondary schools funded by the central and local authorities shall implement free education. However, it was not until 1971 that Hong Kong implemented free primary education. In 1978, nine years of compulsory education was promoted. In 1971, the proportion of Chinese with only primary education was 49.6%, and the proportion of those with university education was only 1.6%. In 1981, the proportion of college education rose to 2.7%. In the same period, the proportion of college students in the UK has reached 15%. Served as the Hong Kong Inspector for 18 years in 1878-1897, Ottoraid, who knows the insider of the British and British ruling class, said without any disguise: "There was almost no such idea in this period to revitalize the Chinese society to match at the level of Europeans." It is for self-interested motives to try to learn English geography and history through the implementation of English education, so that Chinese students can identify British culture, become a "pro-British missionary", and even become China's future part of the bureaucratic class." In 1878, Hong Kong Governor Hennessy held an educational conference and launched a language policy
which is English teaching course was a compulsory course for the official school. Mandarin was an elective course. The English teaching course was increased to 5 hours. The Chinese language teaching was reduced from 4 hours a day to 2 hours and a half. Since then, the following governors have all followed the policy of strengthening English education. Government policies have clearly tended to support English schools, and the number of students receiving English education has increased. The official establishment of the University of Hong Kong in 1912 also marked the formation of a system of English education in Hong Kong that reached its peak and became the mainstream of language education. However, Mandarin was reduced to a "second-class language" and was not taken seriously.

Except for the influence from Colonial period, the cognitive problem of national identity is the most severe issue through the case. According to Public Opinion Programme, The Hong Kong University Public Opinion Research Project (Hong Kong University People's Studies) released the results of the last regular survey before the suspension of operation. It showed that the Hong Kong people's identity with the "Chinese" and "Hong Kong people" was widened to 2.7 points and became China after the reunification. Those who are proud of the nationals have fallen from more than one-third of last year to about one-fourth. All the indicators are the worst after the reunification. The director of the Hong Kong University of China, Zhong Tingyao, feels helpless and pity for the figures. On June 17-20, the Hong Kong University of Hong Kong successfully visited 1,015 Hong Kong residents by random sample telephone interview. The investigation pointed out that the findings of the two anti-amendment of the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance clearly reflected the impact of the amendments to the Hong Kong people's identity and return. According to the report, in terms of identity, the “Hong Kong people” status continues to rank first, regardless of their identity, importance or identity index. After that, they are “Asian”, “world citizen” and “one member of the Chinese nation”. "Chinese" and "nationals of the People's Republic of China". 76% of respondents consider themselves to be Hong Kong people in a broad sense, including “Hong Kong people” or “Hong Kong people in China”; only 23% think they are “Chinese”, that is, answer “Chinese” or “Chinese in Hong Kong”. In addition, in response to the 22nd anniversary of the reunification of the Hong Kong SAR, the pride of Hong Kong people on Chinese national identity fell by 11 percentage points to 27% compared with the same period last year, while the proportion of those who did not feel proud rose by 14 percentage points. To 71%, respectively, a record low or new high since 1997. Regarding the central government's policy on Hong Kong, all figures turned negative, with the latest positive evaluation accounting for 23% and negative evaluation at 53%. An in-depth analysis shows that the younger the citizen is, the lower the ratio of being proud of becoming a Chinese national, and the more negative the evaluation of the central government's policy toward Hong Kong.

All of this statistics illustrates that Hong Kong people, especially the younger generation are lack of national identity for being as Chinese. This phenomenon is caused by educational system in Hong Kong.

According to Gu Minkang, former deputy dean of the School of Law of the City University of Hong Kong, recently wrote that if Hong Kong's education is "ill", then the first thing is that the educators have problems, followed by the textbook. Because of the educational effect, the key is who teach the student and what people teach. If the teacher is objectively neutral, the student is fortunate and may be trained to be truly independent and objective. The Hong Kong Education
Professionals Association ("School of Education"), composed of Hong Kong primary, secondary, primary and kindergarten teachers, is the largest single union in Hong Kong and the organization with the largest number of participating members, but its leadership has long been controlled by Anti-China promoters. In August 2016, Ye Jianyuan, the head of the "School of Education", publicly expressed his support for middle school students to promote “Hong Kong independence” on campus. In mid-August of this year, the Association also took the initiative to launch a parade, which further instigated the indiscriminate group to incite students to strike. Liang Zhenying, the former Chief Executive of Hong Kong government and vice chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, posted on the social networking site that some school sponsors and principals did not dare to deal with teachers with a politically biased position. The secondary education environment must be purified, and minors should not participate in political movements. The disease of education in Hong Kong is also the elimination of Chinese history as a compulsory subject in secondary schools and the disorderly inclusion of general education. Well-known mathematician and professor of Harvard University Qiu Chengtong once said that this is a disaster that has made Hong Kong students "rootless", resulting in a generation of young people who lack a sense of Chinese history, culture, and ideals. Before the reunification of Hong Kong, general education was only an elective course. In 2009, it began to be listed as a compulsory course and was officially launched in Hong Kong. In 2012, general education was included in the Hong Kong College Entrance Examination. The importance can be imagined. However, the Hong Kong High School Liberal Studies Division has been implemented for 10 years. The so-called "textbooks" on the market have been repeatedly exposed to biased or erroneous content. The content of the course, the method of assessment, and the issue of deposit and withdrawal have been controversial. Some schools’ general education various types of teaching materials commonly have the following contents: attacking "one country, two systems"; beautifying illegal "occupying the middle" (another demonstration happened in 2014); intensifying the contradiction between Hong Kong and the mainland; negatively interpreting problems existing in the Mainland, or directly demonizing; introducing outdated data when introducing the mainland; quoting the negative conclusions about the Chinese topic from a typical Western perspective and so on.

Thus, through this development of education and ‘Colonial Heritage’ generation to generation, the national identity in Hong Kong surely are not considered as Chinese citizen, especially for the younger generation, they barely have a concept of home country and national sense of belonging. From deep of mind, part of Hong Kong people are not willing to be Chinese, through daily communicating could prove this conclusion. Although Mandarin is required to be used while communicating with other people, most of Hong Kong people still prefer using Kantonese or English.

THE COGNITIVE IDENTITY OF CHINESE DIASPORA IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Compared with the case happened in Hong Kong, it is different from Hong Kong people who belongs to Chinese nationality officially, almost all of Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia has the national identity from local countries, such as Indonesian Born Chinese, Malaysian Born Chinese and so on. Professor Wang Yiwu, a famous Southeast Asian Chinese scholar, attributed
Southeast Asian Chinese identity to two types of seven kinds of identity: political identity includes Chinese national identity, local national identity, Chinese community identity (Chinese communal identity) "ethnic & racial identity with legal and political right"; cultural identity includes Chinese historical identity, Chinese cultural identity and cultural ethnic identity. From my point of view, the identity of Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia could be divided into two categories: political identity and ethnic identity (including culture, history, community, ethnicity, etc.).

To make a comparison with cognitive identity in Hong Kong, political identity of Chinese diaspora is not counted. Because as we all know, almost all of Chinese diaspora are holding national identity from the place they live. Therefore, ethnic identity will be discussed and compared with the Hong Kong case.

After the Second World War, the overseas Chinese, as descendants of immigrants or immigrants have undergone tremendous changes in the past 50 years. Not only have traditional Chinese communities changed from falling leaves to roots, they have become part of the local pluralistic society, and Chinese new immigrants are also going through this process. In Southeast Asia, except for Singapore, Chinese belong to ethnic minorities. Therefore, in this process of naturalization, it tends to reflect more or less the trend of convergence with local groups. Reflecting the trend of Chinese naturalization in the local area, the first is the transformation of Chinese identity. After the post-war Southeast Asian nation-states became independent, the governments of Southeast Asia, led by the local main ethnic groups, successively promoted the policy of assimilation of Chinese. The new Chinese government (PRC) has also adopted a policy of fostering the awareness of overseas Chinese nationals from the early days of the founding of the People's Republic of China. It has turned into a policy of encouraging overseas Chinese to become naturalized and loyal to the local government. The identity of overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia has undergone fundamental changes. From the pre-war comprehensive identification to China gradually recognized to the local society.

At the level of ethnic identity, the Southeast Asian Chinese diaspora after World War II changed a lot. Ethnic identity is usually determined by two factors: one is Ethnicity and the other is Ethnic Culture. Racial traits refer to the body shape, skin color and certain psychological qualities brought about by ethnic inheritance, that is, the physical norms proposed by Professor Wang Yiwu. As early as before World War II, the number of native Chinese in Southeast Asia exceeded the number of immigrants from China. A large proportion of Chinese diaspora are married to local indigenous people, forming a large mixed-blood Chinese diaspora group, such as Indonesian Peranakan, Malaysian Baba, and the Philippines' Mistizo and Luck Chin from Thailand. This kind of mixed-race Chinese is not purely Chinese in terms of blood, but also the customs of life are not far from the indigenous people. Generally speaking, the blood of Southeast Asian Chinese diaspora has been quite mixed with local indigenous ancestry. Therefore, the influence of ethnic characteristics on the identity of Chinese ethnic groups in Southeast Asia has been weakened with the increasing number of intermarriage. In Southeast Asia, the ethnic group identity plays a leading role in ethnic cultural awareness. This cultural consciousness is a generalization of the group's behavioral characteristics, and is highly expressed as the "Chinese consciousness" of itself. Because Chinese diaspora as one of the main foundations of Chinese culture has become increasingly weak in Southeast Asia after the Second World War, the core of Chinese culture in Southeast Asia is not Chinese, but “Composed Of a Series Of Important Values
And Customs, Often Unconsciously By Individuals Or The Group Is Represented And Constitutes The Daily Life Of The Chinese Diaspora, Which Is Also The Cultural Burden Brought By Chinese Immigrants." The maintenance of Chinese consciousness is not only the basis of Chinese ethnic identity, but also a conscious cultural definition of others and other ethnic groups. Therefore, the Chinese ethnic group in Southeast Asia is largely a subjective sense of belonging.

However, due to changes in various external environments and the adjustment of individual self-identification, the strength and changing of Chinese consciousness has shown great differences in Southeast Asia. Generally speaking, the Chinese ethnic groups in Singapore and Malaysia have a strong sense of identity. They not only show that the individual’s awareness as a Chinese group more clearly, but also that the organizations within the Chinese community are relatively strong, and Chinese individuals and groups are actively involved in various social affairs, especially in political affairs. The Chinese diaspora in Indonesia have been weakened by the endless stream of government and non-governmental excavation events in the past 50 years. From 1965 to 1998, organized some of Chinese groups and Chinese language use have been banned and restricted. Thus, the performance and maintenance of Chinese consciousness has been in a low tide. After 1998, the Indonesian government abolished the restricting law for Chinese diaspora, and the awareness of ethnic Chinese identity in Indonesia has strengthened. In particular, the Indonesian President announced in early 2002 that the Spring Festival is one of Indonesia's national festivals, expressing respect for and encouraging the goodwill of Chinese culture and custom choices. The Chinese in Thailand and the Philippines are assimilated to the local level. Although the Chinese in these two countries actively participate in social charity affairs in the name of individuals and associations, there are few social organizations and activities that attract the participation of the entire Chinese community. After being raided by the Chinese in the 1970s, Vietnamese Chinese have either made a living as a Vietnamese citizen or as a diaspora. The connections between members of the Chinese ethnic group are only carried out on a small scale (such as small-scale fellowships and industries).

To continue maintain the ethnic identity as Chinese descendants, there are two critical procedures need to be proceed, one is inheriting traditional Chinese festivals, another one is using Mandarin as second or third language in their daily life. The most important factor in the composition of ethnic culture is language. From the perspective of ethnology, the national culture that reflects the psychological state of the people is very stable, and language is an important foundation of culture. With the increasing economic life and transcendence of nationalities and transnational borders, modern transportation methods have made geographical boundaries weak, and language has become an important symbol for maintaining the cultural characteristics of ethnic groups. Especially in Southeast Asia, Chinese and local people belong to the same species. If the language of the ethnic group is lost, the process of assimilation will become faster and faster. In general, in Singapore and Malaysia, Chinese language education and using are still quite common, especially in Singapore, which has a high level of Chinese language and is still a carrier of Chinese culture. Compared with these two countries, although other countries in Southeast Asia have not reached the same level with Malaysia and Singapore in Chinese language education. Some of them are promoting to study Mandarin as a study target or second language such as Indonesia. In Indonesia, the government has realized that with the rapid development of China economy, it is a good way to start to learn Mandarin to strengthen cooperation between these two countries in
economic projects or cultural exchange. For example, in Universitas Indonesia, there is a Chinese Literature major for students who are interested in Chinese culture could be studied in Faculty of Humanities.

Another important factor to continue maintain the ethnic identity as Chinese descendants is Chinese traditional holidays. Frankly speaking, traditional festivals are a concentrated form of national culture and folk beliefs, which gathers a strong essence of national culture. During the corresponding festivals in China, overseas Chinese living in different places often have the practice of making dumplings, buying dumplings, eating moon cakes, etc., Chinese diaspora mostly remember or recall the traditional festivals of the nation through the specific cultural behaviors - traditional festivals and foods that symbolize cultural symbols. These traditional festivals and the foods that are associated with the festivals have become the concrete manifestations of Chinese diaspora reminiscing the mother culture. As for Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia, in addition to participating in the traditional Chinese festivals in their current country of residence, the most important festival they have in a year is the Lunar New Year. Various overseas Chinese ethnic groups will hold Spring Festival gatherings or Chun Jie Festival gatherings, China Town in various countries will hold large-scale of Chinese New Year lion dance for celebrating the Lunar New Year, and Chinese street shops will sell festival decorations such as Spring Festival couplets and blessings. Chinese families will post couplets and blessings at the door. Many Chinese diaspora will reunite and dine at the New Year's Eve. According to the habits of the areas where they lived in the country, they will make dumplings, eat fish, eat rice balls or noodles (especially the Chinese diaspora who immigrate from South of China such as Hokian and Kanton), line noodles, and give children a lucky envelope. In addition, they also want to call each other by phone or e-mail and call their relatives and friends in Chinese ethnic groups to celebrate the New Year. In fact, it is precisely the appearance of an ethnic cultural identity. People who are far away from the mother culture use this kind of behavior to achieve the resonance effect and cultural psychological satisfaction of cultural identity.

THE SOLUTIONS TO RESOLVE THE HONG KONG CASE

Through the Hong Kong case, it illustrates that the cognitive identity in Hong Kong exists a conundrum which is part of Hong Kong citizens especially for the younger generation are lack of their own cognition as Chinese citizens. Despite the political factor and facts, the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill (or Anti-ELAB) movement was run by most of young citizens in Hong Kong. It is different with Chinese diaspora groups in Southeast Asia with holding Chinese cultural identity to maintain their identity as the successors from Chinese culture. In Hong Kong arises a even more notable case that shows some of Hong Kong citizens especially the younger generation do not think themselves as Chinese, it proves that their cognitive identity need to be fixed. In my opinion, there are two policies may change the situation happened in Hong Kong. The first one is strengthen patriotic education in Hong Kong education system, the second one is to promote Chinese traditional culture in Hong Kong, just like Chinese diaspora groups in Southeast Asia, increasing the cognition of cultural identity is also an indispensable part of national education.

In Hong Kong, the Chinese History Section just became a compulsory subject for
independent junior high schools in 2018/2019. According to the new syllabus published by the Hong Kong SAR Government Education Bureau in May 2018, Hong Kong history will no longer be listed as an independent issue, but will be integrated into different Chinese historical issues, hoping to cultivate students' national concepts. Due to the case in Hong Kong, all kinds of words and deeds have deeply stung the patriotism of the people of Hong Kong and the mainland. This is precisely the lack of Hong Kong youth national education which leads evil consequences. "Look at the reports in the newspapers. A lot of things about the mainland have been described as negative. The youngsters are stunned. How can he form an objective understanding of the country."

Deng Fei, the principal of Hong Kong's Hong Kong Island, has said that Hong Kong lacks positive guidance. The national education is full of "education" of negative opposition and hatred of the opposition in Hong Kong in last decades years. In order to bring order out of chaos, Hong Kong must reform its education in a drastic manner and promote national education as soon as possible. Promoting national education for students and enhancing the national identity of the people is a consistent practice in all parts of the world. It is in line with Hong Kong's feelings and is also the will of the people. The first Secretary for Justice of the Hong Kong SAR Government, Ms Elsie Leung said that she hopes that young people now spend more time to understand the spirit and culture of the country and the nation. When Hong Kong returns to the motherland, it is not just a change of flag and a change of name. Hong Kong people must have a mental journey to identify with the country and the nation and accept national identity as Chinese citizens.

Except for strengthen national education in Hong Kong, culture identity also should be popularized. Such as Chinese traditional culture, Mandarin and so on. One of the main functions of national education is to inherit culture. Chinese traditional culture and education are closely related. Chinese traditional culture is the spiritual pillar of the Chinese nation, the deep foundation for the development of advanced culture, and an important support for building the spiritual home of the Chinese nation. But nowadays some young people have lost a lot of Chinese traditional culture spirit, so strengthening China's excellent traditional culture education in national education has become an urgent task to carry forward. From my point of view, the first thing need to do is the Hong Kong government should give enormous support and participation in traditional cultural education with schools and other educational institutions. The second one is enhance the educational effect of traditional culture by having traditional festivals. Usually, Chinese traditional holidays could not only teach the history of Chinese culture, but also could improve sense of national identity and national pride. According to the existing education system in Hong Kong, Mandarin is hard to be promoted. There are several reasons why students can't learn Mandarin well. First, learning Mandarin is not that important in Hong Kong. Usually, the general schools has only once a week for learning Mandarin which is the minimum subject in class, and is usually regarded as a branch of Chinese class. Moreover, high school does not need to learn Mandarin again in Hong Kong, therefore, students' attention will not be too high on Mandarin. Second, there is no urgent need for using Mandarin in Hong Kong. From the perspective of linguistics, Hong Kong people do not need to learn to write and read Mandarin, Mandarin mainly is used in listening and speaking. In daily life, most students do not have a language environment to learn Mandarin. However, as we all know that language is the carrier of culture, learning Mandarin is one of the accesses to construct the cognition of cultural and national identity. So, in order to build Hong Kong citizens’ cultural and national identity, Mandarin as a common and official language in
China should be popularized in Hong Kong. With this two procedures proceeded, I believe the cognitive identity problem of Hong Kong citizens will be solved, even more important, the movement like Anti-China demonstration will also be decreased in Hong Kong.

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